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Abstract— In their continuous quest for ecologic 
improvements, private voluntary certification initiatives 
might undermine the willingness to continue of the 
participating farmers. In this research, the ecologic 
contribution and the farmers’ acceptance of changing 
the pesticide policy of a private certification initiative is 
presented. To measure the perceived farmers’ disutility, 
the choice preference technique is used. We can 
conclude that there is room for ecologic improvements 
but that farmers are in general change averse, primarily 
because of the fear that price compensation will remain 
largely absent. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
Recently we see the emergence of  private voluntary 
initiatives for the internalisation of environmental and 
social issues, mainly because regulatory gains can be 
made [1][2], sales can increase via differentiation 
through labelling, the reputation can be enhanced or 
inputs saved through an optimized resource use. The 
voluntary character mainly refers to the absence of the 
use of the State’s coercive power, implying that the 
adoption of the approaches depends on the good-will 
of the involved actors. The standards applied can be 
decomposed into sets of rules, which are listed in 
certification books (or cahiers de charge). Certification 
itself is the procedure by which a third party gives 
written assurance that the product, process or service 
is in conformity with these standards, and it can be 
seen as a form of communication along the supply 
chain [3]. The certification books, containing the sets 
of rules, are social constructs, and reflect the 
equilibrium of stakes of directly and indirectly 
involved stakeholders. With stakeholder composition, 
stakes and power distribution in continuous evolution, 
this certification book equilibrium is only of a 
metastable nature. In this paper we suggest adaptations 
to the pesticide rules of an existing  private 
certification scheme in the fresh vegetable sector in 
Belgium  and discuss the acceptance by the main 
stakeholder group, the farmers. The private scheme 
taken as a case study is the FlandriaGAP scheme, 
which is already an improvement of its predecessor 
Flandria. This scheme started in 1995 and became the 
major certification scheme in the Belgian vegetable 
sector. It offers a guarantee for a high quality product, 
cultivated in an environmentally friendly way and 
fully traceable. 
    
One of the spearheads of environmental 
certification in the vegetable sector is the pesticide 
policy. The before mentioned scheme targets a 
reasoned cultivation and as such incorporates several 
pesticide related rules. Based upon focus group 
sessions with key stakeholders, improvements in the 
certification pesticide policy were suggested relating 
to dose, crop rotation, type of pesticide, origin of 
propagation material, order of pesticide application, 
crop resistance and number of treatments. Through 
multicriteria analysis, the positive contribution to 
ecological sustainability of these new rules is 
demonstrated. Clearly, strengthening the certification 
pesticide policy will not be accepted by the 
participating vegetable growers, at least if an adequate 
price compensation is absent. By means of a choice 
experiment, farmers’ disutility and willingness to 
accept (WTA) of these new rules is measured. 
II. THEORETIC FRAMEWORK 
Private certification systems that introduce rules to 
reduce the environmental pressure can be considered 
as examples of institutions of sustainability (IoS). The 
latter term was introduced by Hagedorn [4] and refers 
to sets of rules (constraints) that we impose on our 
interaction with nature. By making the certification 
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pesticide policy more restrictive, the farmers 
internalize part of their external costs. In this context, 
Hagedorn distinguishes between integrative and 
segregative institutions, with the former, opposite to 
the latter, indicating (amongst other) the 
internalization of gains and costs. When the 
certification institution, as a set of rules, becomes 
more restrictive, f.e. in its pesticide policy, then it 
evolves in the direction of an integrative institution, 
triggering higher transaction and opportunity costs for 
the participants, but simultaneously allowing them to 
reap some reputational gains from the institutional 
change.  
 
In this paper, the possible improvements in the 
pesticide policy of an existing private certification 
scheme were presented to the participating farmers, 
with the aim of unravelling the ‘costs of integration’ 
for the farmers, or the cost for the internalization of 
part of the external costs. The improvements were 
obtained by comparing the existing certification 
scheme with a virtual optimal system, the latter 
composed of the sets of rules of ‘the best available 
alternatives in the market’, according to a series of 
environmental experts, as explained in section 4.   
III. MEASURING THE ECONOMIC ACCEPTANCE 
BY THE PARTICIPANTS  
The basic aim of the Stated Choice technique in this 
context is to obtain utility estimates for the different 
options of the certification book rules incorporated in 
our experiment (i.e. the different attribute levels). This 
utility measure can then be interpreted (is there a 
utility difference between the levels?) and used for, for 
example willingness to accept estimates, simulations 
and calculations of the effects of marginal changes to 
these levels. To obtain the utility estimates, multiple 
choice sets are constructed, each of which constitutes 
of several alternatives (3 in our experiments). The 
individual farmers were asked to choose amongst the 
three alternatives in a choice set their most preferred 
one. The alternatives on their turn are a combination 
of several attributes, with each of these attributes 
having different levels, depending on the choice set. 
As an example, with farmer 1 choosing alternative 1 in 
the first choice set, we know he derives a higher utility 
from the attribute levels of alternative 1 compared to 
those of alternative 2 or 3. The basic choice model, 
called the conditional logit choice or multinomial logit 
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Pi is the probability that alternative i is chosen, V is 
the deterministic part of utility, function of observed 
factors. As suggested by [6], the deterministic parts 
Vjn are assumed to be linear, additive functions in the 
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The  β‘s are estimated by means of conventional 
maximum likelihood techniques. For an in depth 
description of the choice preference technique, we 
refer to [5] or [7].          
 
In January, 2006, 68 farmers residing in the 
province of Antwerp were personally questioned. 
Table 1 summarizes the main descriptives and 
frequencies for the sampled farmer group.  
Table 1 Descriptives/frequencies for sampled farmers 
Item Descr. 
-  Number of farmers  68 
-  Firm type (combinations possible) 
           Open air  
           Greenhouse traditional 





-  Number of crops 
            1 
            2  





-  Principal crop types 
           Tomato (and varieties) 





The selection of these farmers was purely at 
random, based upon visual recognition of the farms. 
This methodology was used because privacy policy 
forbids the auctions to make available the addresses of 
farmers producing under the standard. Because our 
principal aim was to test the methodology, the 
selection of farmers was for us of secondary 
importance. Therefore the results should be taken as 
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indicative rather than inclusive. The survey consisted 
of three parts. The first part covered questions 
concerning personal and farm characteristics of the 
farmers affiliated to FlandriaGAP. In the second part, 
the vegetable growers were asked to choose amongst 
several alternatives based upon changes in the 
certification book as a whole, while in the third part, 
they were asked to make a choice amongst several 
alternatives with attributes only relating to pesticide 
use reduction.  
 
The choice experiments are built round three 
scenarios, a base scenario reflecting the current 
prescriptions level, and two scenarios with more 
severe prescriptions. The choice experiment attributes 
and their levels as presented to the farmers were 
selected based upon the outcome of focus group 
sessions with farmers, environmental scientists, 
government officials, vegetable chain members and 
pressure groups. They imply a further restriction on 
the pesticide policy within the cahier the charge of the 
certification standard under study. A further restriction 
of pesticide use is not warmly welcomed by the 
majority of the farmers, given the already limited 
freedom of movement in this area for the gardeners. In 
Table 2 the selected attributes and their corresponding 
levels are listed. 
 
The full factorial (i.e. all possible combinations of 
attribute levels) results into 5 x 2
8 = 1280 alternatives. 
To reduce this number, an orthogonal main effects 
plan was constructed, which contains a minimum of 
16 alternatives for this design. The alternatives in the 
resulting orthogonal plan are randomly combined 
without replacement into a choice set of 3 profiles (a 
base scenario, reflecting the current situation, and 2 
hypothetical scenarios). Participating farmers were 
asked to choose their preferred alternative in each 
profile set. For the general experiment, 16 profile sets 
were constructed. To reduce the cognitive burden for 
the participants due to a high number of choice tasks 
(16), the design was split into blocks of 4 choice sets 
per respondent. The farmer was asked to choose 
amongst A, B, and C, after comparing the different 
attribute levels. 
 
Table 2 Certification initiative attributes and attribute levels 
in choice experiment 2 
Attributes Attribute  levels 
Calculation of dose/ha  current system (dose and area) / 
driving speed and application 
pressure incorporated 
Crop rotation  Not compulsory / compulsory if 
technically feasible 
Pesticides  allowed  Only SRC* list / SRC list and 
positive list, subject to motivation 
Propagation material   Plant  passport  compulsory  / 
current level (recommended) 
Choice  of  pesticide  Follow colour code of SRC / 
motivation of choice sufficient 
Choice of crop variety  Minimal  dependency  on 
agrochemicals / several criteria 
Treatments with highly 
noxious pesticides 
Halving of the number of 
treatments / current level 
Relative change in price   0 % / 0,5 %  / 1 %/ 2 %/ 3 % 
  * SRC: Service for Residue Control 
Terms in italic correspond with the current level 
IV. MODELLING RESULTS FOR THE 
ECOLOGICAL CONTRIBUTION AND FARMERS’ 
PREFERENCES 
Multicriteria analysis (the revised Simos method, 
see [8], [9] and [10], is used to determine the relative 
score of all major Belgian fruit and vegetable 
certification initiatives on the ecology axis of 
sustainability. The developed environmental 
sustainability analysis method is based on an approach 
already applied in France [11]. For a detailed 
description, see [12]. In short, expert panels were 
asked to rank the rules of different certification 
systems based upon their contribution to the different 
pillars of ecological sustainability. As such, a 
hypothetic ideal certification book containing all the 
best rules of the different initiatives, as well as the 
relative distance of the existing initiatives from this 
book, could be determined. The ecological 
performance measure furthermore allows to evaluate 
potential improvements of a label, as illustrated in 
Figure 1. In this figure, the original Flandria certificate 
rules compared to the FlandriaGAP (this is the 
EurepGAP aligned version of Flandria) standard and 
the proposed improved FlandriaGAP’ standard are 
indicated. The proposed improvements were the 
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criteria used in the choice experiment (CE). By using 
the scores from the expert panels for the rules 
integrated in the CE, we are able to calculate the 
increased beneficial effect on ecology of the 
introduction of these extra rules. For those rules in the 
CE that were not integrated in the general checklist, 
we used the scores of closely related rules (proxies). In 





















Flandria FlandriaGap FlandriaGap' Virtual max.
 
Fig. 1 Performance of the Flandria, the FlandriaGap and the 
FlandriaGap’ standard for ecologic sustainability 
 
As can be seen in Figure 2, although the CE focuses 
on those measures in the certification book related to 
pesticide reduction, beneficial effects can be noted for 




















Flandria FlandriaGap Dose Flandriagap2 Virtual max.
 
Fig. 2 Effect of dose recalculation on environmental 
sustainability score of FlandriaGap 
 
Thus, by changing one certification rule, effects 
resort for different sustainability items simultaneously. 
As an example, Figure 2 shows the effect on 
FlandriaGAP’s scores of adding the rule ‘for the 
calculation of the pesticide dose, driving speed and 
application pressure should be taken into account’. 
This measure is not that effective for pest pressure 
reduction, but, unexpectedly, it contributes highly to 
the ‘Waste reduction and management’-pillar (black 
arrow). Furthermore, the graph shows that the score of 
the hypothetical FlandriaGap’ on Pest Pressure 
Reduction nearly reaches the virtual maximum score 
(see the orange arrow). Furthermore, the pillar ‘Air 
Quality’ receives the largest contribution from the 7 
adapted rules jointly. 
Now let us divert our attention to the affected 
farmer. The Likelihood Ratio test indicates that the 
choice preference model with parameters for the 
attributes is a significant improvement compared to 
the model with constants only (the Base model), see 
Table 3. Table 4 reports the estimates for the attribute 
levels. We made use of dummy coding, hence the 
current situation is considered as having a zero utility 
(no negative nor positive utility). The table represent 
the alternative (more restrictive) attribute levels. The 
significant utility estimates all have the correct sign.  
Table 3 LL ratio test for the model CE2 




Χ²(6)   Sign 
-197,91 -217,76 39,7  1,63  yes 
Table 4 Modelling results for the Choice Experiment  
Attribute Coeff  S.E.  P  Wta 
Calculation of dose/ha  -0.976  0.285  0.001  2.31 
Crop rotation   0.224  0.259  0.386   
Pesticides allowed   0.341  0.264  0.196   
Propagation material  -0.725  0.283  0.010  1.71 
Choice of pesticide   0.225  0.249  0.366   
Choice of crop variety  -1.033  0.273  0.000  2.44 
Treatments with 
noxious pesticides  -0.451  0.271  0.096  1.07 
Relative change in 
price   0.423  0.125  0.001 
 
Status Quo   1.049  0.365  0.004   
Remark: attribute levels represent the alternative 
situation 
 
The status quo coefficient is significant in this 
experiment, meaning that the farmer, regardless of the 
attributes, prefers the current situation over the new 
alternative, and hence is change averse. As was 
repeatedly indicated during focus group sessions with 
the farmers, they fear that price compensation for 
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more restrictive rules will only be of a temporary 
nature, due to the main retailers’ market power. 
 
Based upon the estimates for the choice experiment, 
the most adverse modification of the certification book 
from farmers’ point of view seems to be the demand to 
use the crop variety which minimally depends on 
agrochemicals. Taking into account that this measure 
is the one that most affects crop yields, this outcome is 
logic. The other alternative measures are not 
welcomed either, with recalculation of dose per 
hectare and documentation for propagation material as 
most significant ones. The fact that some of the 
proposed changes result into non significant 
coefficients is mainly due to the sample constellation, 
which predominantly constitutes of greenhouse 
(substrate) gardeners. A more extensive sample will 
probably yield more significant coefficients. 
 
As an example, the following graph, Figure 3, 
combines the ecologic and economic effects of 
introducing the new rule on dose calculation. The 
ecologic contribution is clearly positive and covers 
different ecologic sustainability fields. From farmers’ 
(economic) point of view however, the new rule seems 
disfavourable, as indicated by a negative WTA of 


































































































































Fig. 3 Impact of the new ‘Calculation of dose/ha’- rule on 
ecology and economy 
This negative WTA originates from different 
economic motivations simultaneously. As farmers are 
in general change averse,  a new rule means the 
alteration of familiar practises. Secondly, the new rule 
demands a learning effort from the farmers: how does 
it need to be applied in practice, what should be 
calculated, etc. Thirdly, there is a need for investment 
in the appropriate spraying equipment (whether this is 
new or adapted equipment). Fourthly, the rule 
demands extra labour in the field, not only for the 
calculation of the new doses, but also during 
application (maintaining the previously calculated 
speed and spraying pressure). Finally, the rule also 
increases the registration efforts associated with 
certification. 
V. CONCLUSION CHANGES IN PESTICIDE 
POLICY 
By changing the rule in a certification book into the 
ecologically most desirable alternative or by adding 
such a rule, the ecological improvement of the 
certification standard is unquestionable. The choice 
experiment made clear that farmers generally strongly 
advise against changes in the pesticide policy within 
the certification initiative, because they currently 
already feel under high pressure from government, 
society and buyers and thus see ample room for 
evolution. The resource base of farmers has been 
narrowed over the years, which is especially true for 
certified farmers, while the demands have become 
increasingly stringent. Farmers fear that, due to the 
market power of buyers, a more demanding 
certification standard will, in the end, not be 
compensated by a corresponding farm level price 
increase. Thus, from a farmer’s perspective, the main 
advantage of moving towards more integrative 
institutions is absent. However, by following the new 
rules, market access to preferred sales channels 
remains open. From a buyer and a society point of 
view, the new institution is a clear improvement, 
because external costs are internalized at fairly low 
costs, with possible reputational gains and without 
needing restrictive public interference.      
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